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Does consumer behavior exhibit time inconsistency? This is an essential, yet
difficult question to answer. This dissertation attempts to answer this question
based on a large-scale randomized experiment in the credit card market. Specifi-
cally, we apply both time consistent preferences (exponential) and time inconsistent
preferences (hyperbolic) to study two puzzling phenomena in the experiment.
The two puzzling phenomena seem to suggest time inconsistency in consumer
behavior. First, more consumers accept an introductory offer that has a lower inter-
est rate with a shorter duration than a higher interest rate and a longer duration.
However, ex post borrowing behavior reveals that the longer duration offer is better,
because respondents keep on borrowing on the credit card after the introductory
period. Second, consumers are reluctant to switch, and many of those consumers
who have switched before fail to switch again later.
A multi-period model with complete information is studied analytically, which
shows that standard exponential preferences cannot explain the observed behavior
because they are time consistent. However, hyperbolic preferences that are time
inconsistent come closer to rationalizing the observed behavior. In particular, two
special cases of hyperbolic discounting are carefully examined, sophisticated and
naive. Sophisticated consumers prefer the short offer because it serves as a self-
commitment device. Naive consumers prefer the short offer because they underes-
timate their future debt.
To further explore the possibility of explaining observed behavior by expo-
nential preferences, we study a dynamic model in which realistic random shocks
are incorporated. Estimation results show that consumers have severe self-control
problem with a present-bias factor β = 0.8. It is also shown that the average switch-
ing cost is $150. With the estimated parameters, the dynamic model can replicate
quantitative features of the data.
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The exponential discounted utility model (DU) proposed by Samuelson (1937) is a
standard theoretical model for consumer intertemporal choices. The central assump-
tion of the DU model is that consumer intertemporal impatience can be condensed
into one parameter, a constant discount rate per period. Constant discounting im-
plies that consumers’ intertemporal preferences are time consistent.
A significant body of evidence, however, has been gathered in experimental
psychology and economics studies, that consumers have a declining rate of time
preferences. Researchers find that a hyperbolic functional form, which imposes
declining discount rates, fits such experiment data much better that the exponential
function. Declining discount rates imply that consumers are time inconsistent.
Motivated by experiments, economists have studied implications of declining
discount rates in various economic settings, such as procrastination, retirement, ad-
diction and credit card borrowing.1 They have developed a particular simple func-
tional form, a quasi-hyperbolic function. This mathematical formulation is highly
tractable and captures the essence of hyperbolic discounting, a declining discount
rate. We shall simply refer it as hyperbolic discounting in later discussion.
1See Akerlof (1991), Diamond and Koszegi (2003), Gruber and Koszegi (2001), Harris and
Laibson (2001), Laibson (1997), Laibson et al. (1998), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999, 2001).
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Regardless of substantial theoretical work, the hyperbolic discounting is criti-
cized for lack of convincing empirical evidence. The credibility of laboratory response
is questionable. And field evidence is very hard to come by. Since the essential dif-
ference between exponential and hyperbolic discounting is time consistency, an ideal
test is to compare consumers’ long run plans with their later actions. The plans
are determined by their expected future time preferences, however the actions are
determined by their current preferences, which will be consistent for exponential
consumers, however inconsistent for hyperbolic consumers.
In our study we have access to a market experiment, which is an almost ideal
test. In the experiment, 600,000 consumers are randomly mailed one out of six
different credit card offers, denoted as Market Cell A to F. The six offers have
different introductory interest rates and different durations: Market Cell A (4.9%
for 6 months), B (5.9% for 6 months), C (6.9% for 6 months), D (7.9% for 6 months),
E (6.9% for 9 months) and F (7.9% for 12 months). All other characteristics of
the solicitations are identical across the six market cells. Consumer responses and
subsequent usage of respondents for 24 months are observed.
One advantage of this experiment is that the 600,000 subjects do not change
their behavior due to their participation in the experiment; indeed, they do not even
know that they are part of an experiment. A second advantage of this experiment
is that consumer long-run plans are inferred from their actions. Consumer plans are
identified from their responses to different offers, such as A (4.9% for 6 months) and
F (7.9% for 12 months). For example, if the consumers who receive the short intro-
ductory offer (A) are more likely to accept the credit card than those who receive
the longer introductory offer (F) — and, given the randomized experimental treat-
ment, the two groups may be viewed as identical — it implies that the consumers
expect their credit card debt to be short-lived. For purposes of inferring experi-
mental subjects’ long-run plans, actions speak much louder than words. A third
advantage of this experiment is that the number of experimental subjects (600,000
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consumers solicited, and more than 5,000 consumers accepting the solicitation) is
quite large, ensuring that the inferences drawn will be precise. Combining the sub-
jects’ inferred plans with their later actions, we have a unique opportunity to test
for time consistency.
There are two phenomena in this dataset suggestive of time inconsistency.
First, significantly more consumers in Market Cell A are found to accept their offers
than in Market Cell F. This ex ante preference becomes puzzling after observing that
respondents, ex post, keep on borrowing on this card well after introductory periods.
We will show in a later chapter that respondents in Market Cell A would pay less
interest if their cards were repriced as offer F. Why do not all their counterparts
in Market Cell F accept the F offer? We term the first puzzle as “rank reversal.”
Second, consumer switching behavior is not consistent over time. The majority
of respondents (60%) stay with this card after the introductory period, and their
debts remain at the same level as when they accepted this card. Given the same
debt level, it should be worthwhile to switch a second time since it was optimal to
accept this offer before. Obviously, there would be no puzzle if respondents did not
receive new low-rate solicitations from other credit card issuers after the end of the
introductory period. However, the number of solicitations averaged at least three
per qualified household per month during the sample period. A typical solicitation
from the observed issuer (and other credit card issuers contemporaneously) included
a 5.9% introductory interest rate for 6 months. 96% of the respondents remain
credit-worthy after 6 months, which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.
At least two explanations are possible for consumer behavior that on the sur-
face appears to be time inconsistent. First, consumers may behave in a time in-
consistent fashion because they have hyperbolic time preferences. Hyperbolic con-
sumers have a much higher discount rate in the short run than in the long run.
Therefore their credit card choice, which is largely determined by short-run benefit,
may not be optimal from the long-run perspective. Second, consumers are subject
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to random shocks, the ex post realizations of which may generate divergences be-
tween consumers’ initial plans and later actions, even if their preferences are time
consistent.
In this dissertation, we examine the validity of both hypotheses. To build up
a basic intuition, we analyze a multi-period credit card choice model without uncer-
tainty. The simple model shows that exponential consumers will never exhibit “rank
reversal”. Exponential agents always prefer an offer requiring less interest payment.
This is due to their time consistency, which makes their short-run choice (credit
card choice) also optimal from the long-run perspective (later interest payment).
However, “rank reversal” is possible for hyperbolic consumers. There are two kinds
of hyperbolic preferences which have been widely studied in the literature: sophis-
ticated and naive. Our studies show that both versions are able to explain “rank
reversal”, even though the underlying economic stories are different. A sophisticated
hyperbolic consumer who recognizes her time inconsistency problem would like to
precommit to avoid overspending in the future. Accepting a shorter introductory
offer, rather than a longer one, serves as a commitment device, even though she
would pay less interest if she accepted the longer offer. A naive hyperbolic con-
sumer, however, trades a longer offer for a shorter one because she underestimates
the amount she will borrow in the future. This underestimation is due to the fact
that she naively believes that her future selves will be as patient as she desires now.
To explore the possibility of explaining behavior with random shocks, we de-
velop a dynamic model which incorporates three important random processes. First,
consumer income has both persistent and transitory shocks. Second, receiving new
introductory offers is probabilistic. Third, accepting a new offer causes the consumer
to incur a random switching cost. A realistic dynamic model is required because
some researchers argue that exponential discounting can explain anomalies if “even
a small degree of” uncertainty is incorporated, for example Fernandez-Villaverde
and Mukherji(2002), which we show is not necessarily the case here.
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We find that an exponential model still cannot reconcile respondents’ contin-
ued borrowing and preference for the shorter offer A, even with random shocks. The
intuition for the failure is that the behavioral discrepancy observed is not for some
individuals but for a large group of consumers. An individual exponential consumer
may, ex ante, accept an offer that proves, ex post, to be a bad deal based on the
realized random shocks. However, a relatively large group of exponential consumers
should prefer the offer that on average provides the lowest interest payment. Hy-
perbolic time preferences are also incorporated into the dynamic model, from which
we estimate time preference parameters with a reasonable degree of precision.
Estimation results show that the second puzzle can only be explained by the
stochastic nature of switching costs, which are traditionally assumed to be con-
stant for an individual. Our random switching cost appears to be a more realistic
treatment, because it captures either fluctuations in free time or fluctuations due to
subjective, psychological factors that strongly affect realized switching costs. Under
this interpretation, respondents in this experiment accept the offers due to their low
realized switching costs at the time of solicitation. However, their mean switching
costs are much higher, which can be partially inferred from the low response rate
(1%). This high mean will keep the majority of respondents from switching a second
time after the introductory period.
Another interesting finding is that sophisticated and naive hyperbolic models
behave alike when β is close to 1. Our estimated β equals to 0.8 under which
the two models are not distinguishable. This finding is worth mentioning because
sophisticated models are much more difficult to compute than naive models. Since
sophisticated agents know that they have different time preferences at different time
points, they essentially play a dynamic game between intertemporal selves. Therefor
the sophisticate model faces standard difficulties around dynamic games, such as
multiple equilibria. On the other hand, naive models are as easy as exponential
models. Computation doesn’t involve strategic choices between intertemporal selves
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because naive agents don’t know they are time inconsistent. Since they behave
similar under empirical relevant parameters, it is reasonable to use naive models to
approximate sophisticated models in positive analysis.
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 we give a review of previous
theoretic and empirical studies of intertemporal discounting. In Chapter 3, the
unique dataset is introduced and interesting phenomena are elaborated. Chapter
4 will analyze a complete information model, which illustrates that the interesting
phenomena are puzzling under exponential discounting. The dynamic model with
incomplete information, which accommodates both exponential and hyperbolic time
preferences, is presented in Chapter 5. The estimation strategy and results are
discussed in Chapter 6. Lastly, we conclude this study in Chapter 7.
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Chapter 2
Studies of Time Discounting
Intertemproal choices, decisions involve tradeoffs among costs and benefits occurring
at different time, are important and ubiquitous. Such decisions not only affect one’s
wealth, but may also, as Adam Smith first recognized, determine the economic
prosperity of nations.
Jonh Rae’s The Sociology Theory of Capital discusses the underlying psycho-
logic motives, which determines a nation’s ” the effective desire of accumulation”,
which in turn decides a society’s level of saving. He believed that intertemporal
choices was the joint product of four factors, two promoting and the other two lim-
iting the desire of saving. The two main factors which promoted the desire are the
bequest motives and the propensity to exercise self-restraint. One limiting factor is
the uncertainty of human life. The second factor that limited the effective desire
was the excitement of immediate consumption.
Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk began modeling intertemporal choices in the same
terms as other economic tradeoffs, as a ’technical’ decision about allocating resources
over different points of time, much as one would allocate resources between housing
and food. This treatment was formalized by Irving Fisher. Fisher plotted the in-
tertemporal consumption decision on a two-good indifference diagram, with current
consumption on the abscissa and the second period consumption on the ordinate.
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This representation made clear that a person’s intertemporal allocation depends on
both time preferences and diminishing marginal utility. Pure time preference can be
interpreted as the marginal rate of substitution on the diagonal where consumption
is equal in both periods.
In 1937, Paul Samuelson introduced the DU model. He intended to offer a gen-
eralized model of intertemporal choices applicable to multiple time periods. Fisher’s
graphical indifference-curve analysis was difficult to extend to more than two peri-
ods. In this general model, all psychological concerns underlying time preferences
were condensed into a single parameter, the discount rate.
The DU model assumes a person’s intertemporal utility function can be de-
scribed by the following functional form:
U t (ct, ..., cT ) =
T−t∑
k=0
D (k)u (ct+k) , where D (k) = δ
k.
u (ct+k) is the person’s cardinal instantaneous utility function and D (k) is the per-
son’s discount function, the relative weight she attaches in period t to her well-being
in period t + k. The constant δ is the pure rate of time preference which is meant
to reflect the collective effects of the four ”psychological” motives discussed above.
The DU model has since been widely adopted as the standard framework of
choice for analyzing intertemporal decisions, because it has provided simple but suc-
cessful explanations of observed economic phenomena. However legitimacy of the
DU model has long been questioned by some researchers. Strotz (1956) was the
first to consider alternatives to exponential discounting. He pointed out that there
is no reason why an individual should have such a special discount function. Based
on his casual observation, he suggested that special attention should be given to
the case of declining discount rates. Moreover, he showed that a person would have
time inconsistent preferences for any discount functions other than exponential. He
proposed two strategies that might be employed by a person who foresees her incon-
sistency: the strategy of precommitment (she commits to some plan of action) and
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the strategy of consistent planning (she modifies her current action to accommodate
future actions).
More recent laboratory experiments show that subjects have a declining rate of
time preference, for example, Ainslie and Haendel (1983), Loewenstein and Thaler
(1989) and Thaler (1981). In Ainslie and Haendel (1983), experimental subjects are
asked the following two questions:
Question1:Would you rather receive $50 today or $100 in 6 months?
Question2:Would you rather receive $50 in one year or $100 in 1 year plus 6 months?
Many subjects chose the smaller-sooner reward in the first question and the larger-
later reward in the second. This phenomenon has been termed as “preference rever-
sal.” as empirical evidence against exponential discounting. The argument is that
subjects apparently apply a larger discount rate for a six-month delay as the delay
becomes closer, while exponential time preferences assume that consumers use the
same discount rate for any equal-distance period.
Motivated by the laboratory evidence, Laibson and his collaborators have de-






1 if k = 0
βδk if k > 0
.
Using this simple (β, δ) formulation, they have explored the implication of hyperbolic
discounting under different economic settings.
Akerlof (1991) applies it to rationalize procrastination and cult obedience.
Laibson (1997) analyzes a model where hyperbolic consumers have access to a lim-
ited commitment tool: an illiquid asset. That model is able to explain why con-
sumers have asset-specific marginal propensities to consume. Laibson and et. al
(1998) calibrate a hyperbolic model to evaluate the efficacy of tax-deferred saving
instruments, such as 401(k) plan. O’ Donoghue and Rabin (1999) is the first to dis-
1Phelps (1968) first used this function to model “imperfectly altruistic” across generations.
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tinguish between two kinds of hyperbolic discounting, sophisticated and naive. They
find these two models behave quite differently when facing two kinds of activities,
one involving immediate cost and the other immediate benefit. Naive people pro-
crastinate activities with immediate costs and preprope immediate-benefit activities.
Sophisticated mitigates procrastination but exacerbates preproperation. Diamond
and Koszegi (1999) explores hyperbolic consumers’ saving and retirement decisions.
Gurber and Koszegi (1999)estimate the optimal tax for cigarettes when people have
hyperbolic preferences. Imrohoroglu et. al (2000) examine the role of social se-
curity in an economy where consumers have time inconsistent preferences. Della
Vigna and Malmendier (2003) analyzes the optimal contract design of firms when
consumers have time-inconsistent preferences. Like O’ Donoghue and Rabin (1999),
they consider two types of goods, investment goods which involves immediate cost
and leisure goods which involves immediate benefit. They find that firms will price
investment goods below marginal costs and above marginal costs for leisure goods.
Despite the surge of interest, some researchers challenge the validity of the
experimental evidence which are commonly cited to justify hyperbolic discounting.
Fernandez-Villaverde and Mukerji (2002) explain the above “preference reversal”
by uncertainty. They argue that when comparing payments between today and 6
months later. Uncertainty will reduce the attractiveness of the future payment but
not today’s. However, when comparing two future payments, one year and one and
half year, the uncertainty is relevant for both. The two questions are not equiva-
lent, hence the preference change doesn’t necessarily support hyperbolic discounting.
Actually, some experiments have been conducted, where equivalent questions were
asked and consumers were still found to have a declining discount rate. For example,
in Benzion, Rapoport and Yagil (1989), researchers solicit subjects’ willingness to
pay to expedite a payment of $100 for different time delays, 0.5, 1, 2 and 4 years.
In this experiment, subjects are comparing today’s payment with different future
payments, which should be comparable. Rubinstein (2003) provides another deci-
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sion theory to explain laboratory observations. Bershorov and Coffey (2003) give
a comprehensive review of laboratory experiments. They argue that experiments
which give subjects money at different time periods cannot distinguish hyperbolic
from exponential time preferences because both preferences will maximize wealth.
Based on this argument, the only possible way to identify hyperbolic discounting
is nonfinancial rewards. However, utilities from goods or service may vary as the
environment change, not necessarily preference change. Our study shows that, con-
trary to Bershorov and Coffey (2003), there exists financial experiments which can
separate exponential and hyperbolic preferences.
The essential difference between an exponential and hyperbolic consumer is
that whether “current self” and “future self” agree on the desired discount factor
in the future, not whether the discount factor is exactly the same for any equal-
distance period. An exponential consumer has the same discount factor (δ) between
period t and t+1 no matter which period she is at. However, a hyperbolic consumer
has a discount factor δ between period t and t + 1 at period τ < t, and a discount
factor βδ at period t. Because of this, a hyperbolic consumer would like to revise her
consumption plan made at period τ < t when period t arrives. This revision does
not exist in the exponential model. Therefore, to identify hyperbolic discounting, it
is vital to solicit consumer time preferences dynamically.
Several dynamic experiments have been studied, such as in Read and van
Leeuwen (1998). Subjects are asked to choose between healthy and unhealthy food
both in advance and immediately before the snacks are given. They find that sub-
jects are more likely to make the unhealthy choice when asked immediately before
the snacks are given than when asked a week in advance. However, this evidence
is also questionable that subjects may not tell the truth when they are first asked,
because they know they can always change their mind later.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, in our market experiment we can infer consumer
long-run plans from their relative preference between a lower but shorter introduc-
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tory offer and a higher however longer offer, which reveals the preference of “current
self”. We also observe their subsequent actual behavior, which reveals preference of
“future self”. By comparing the two, we can identify time inconsistent preferences.
And since consumers face financial rewards, we don’t face the same interpretation
difficulty as that in experiments of nonfinancial rewards.
Recently, some researchers start to collect field evidence for consumer time
preferences. They have analyzed consumer behavior in different markets, such as
the credit card market (Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2000)), the health club
market (Della Vigna and Malmendier (2001)), and the labor market (Fang and
Silverman (2001) , Paserman (2001)).
Among them, the most related one is Della Vigna and Malmendier (2001),
which utilizes a similar identification strategy. They identify consumer time incon-
sistency by comparing their initial contractual choices among an annual contract, a
monthly contract and a pay-per-visit, with their later actual attendance. They find
that members who choose a monthly contract with a fee of $70 attend on average
4.8 times per month. They pay more than $17 per visit even though a $10-per-visit
fee is also available. They use a (partially) naive hyperbolic models to explain this
puzzle. In the study, they focus on first-time users. The inexperienced users may
choose the wrong contract because they have incorrect expectations about their fu-
ture attendance. Actually they find strong evidence that club members learn over
time: they switch to a more appropriate contract given their actual attendance. An
experienced sample is very important when identifying consumer time-inconsistency
from their behavior at different dates. In Chapter 3 we will show that consumers in
our sample are very familiar with credit card offers.
Another interesting study is Laibson et. al (2000), which attempt to reconcile
the high frequency of credit card borrowing with high level wealth accumulation.
They find that an exponential model which matches the wealth level predicts only
20% population borrow on credit cards, far less than the empirical data 60%. After
14





A substantial portion of credit card marketing today is done via direct-mailed preap-
proved solicitations. The typical solicitation includes a low introductory interest
rate for a known duration, followed by a much higher post-introductory interest
rate. Sophisticated card issuers decide on the terms of their solicitations by con-
ducting large-scale randomized trials. The dataset used is results of such a “market
experiment” conducted by a major United States issuer of bank credit cards in 1995.
The issuer generated a mailing list of 600,000 consumers and randomly assigned the
consumers into 6 equal-sized market cells (A-F). The market cells have different
introductory offers as mentioned above but are otherwise identical (including the
same post-introductory interest rate of 16%).
In each market cell, between 99860 and 99890 observations are actually ob-
tained, out of the 100,000 consumers. About half of the missing observations are
due to one known data problem: the approximately 5% of the individuals who have
responded to the preapproved solicitation but are declined (due to a deterioration
of credit condition or failure to report adequate information or income) are deleted
from the dataset for unknown reasons. Nevertheless, over 99.8% of the sample is
still included. Ausubel (1999) has offered statistical evidence that this is still a
good random experiment among the remaining observations. Financial statistics of
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the remaining 599,257 consumers are observed at the time of solicitation and their
responses to their offers are recorded.
For consumers who accepted their credit offers (respondents) we observe great
details about their monthly account activities for subsequent 24 months. For a
month t, we observe the amount that the account has paid at the beginning, the
amount it has charged during the month, any finance charge (such as interest pay-
ment, late-payment fee and over-credit-limit fee) and the total balance owed at the
end. Based on the information, we distinguish credit card debt from convenience
charges, for which no interest is billed. In later analysis, we will focus on debt.
Besides the quantitative measures, we also observe two interesting qualitative
measures. The first measures the delinquency status: whether the account is delin-
quent this month or not and the duration of the delinquency. The second measures
whether the account owner has filed for a personal bankruptcy or not. These two
measures offer important information about the account credit status over time.
Important financial statistics of the whole sample and respondents are reported
in Table (3.1). “Months on File” is the number of months a consumer has been with
the credit bureau. “Number of Past-due” is the number of 30-day past-due in last
12 months. “Revolving Balance” is the total balance on those revolving accounts,
composed of convenience charges incurring no interest payments and debt. “Re-
volving Limit” is the total credit limit a consumer has on her revolving accounts.1
Most observables of respondents are statistically worse than the whole sample. Nev-
ertheless, both groups are established good credit risk. Majority of consumers have
more than ten-year credit history. Every consumer has at least one existing credit
card and 75% have more than two credit cards. They are good risk because very
few have been past due in last two years, which is shown in “Number of Past-due”.
And none of them has had a sixty-day past-due, which is considered to be a severe
1Revolving accounts are the accounts on which consumers can borrow with no prespecified
repayment plan. The majority of revolving accounts are credit cards.
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N Months On Number of Revolving Revolving Number of Income
File Past-due Balance Limit Credit Cards
All 599,257 174 0.0197 $2,509 $17,481 3.77 NA
(71) (0.139) (4058) (11388) (1.88)
A 1073 126 0.0308 $3,927 $15,473 3.94 $44,180
(76) (0.1727) (4979) (10573) (2.057) (24051)
B 903 128 0.0266 $3,474 $15,137 3.81 $43,170
(79) (0.1609) (4725) (11112) (2.101) (25175)
C 687 114 0.0247 $3,543 $14,230 3.598 $42,253
(77) (0.1555) (4901) (11268) (2.068) (24437)
D 645 112 0.0248 $3,584 $14,075 3.557 $41,215
(76) (0.1557) (4988) (11703) (2.07) (25274)
E 992 125 0.0363 $3,694 $15,176 3.729 $43,830
(76) (0.1871) (5066) (11313) (2.076) (28733)
F 944 123 0.0222 $4,042 $15,107 3.807 $43,697
(77) (0.1476) (5469) (10688) (1.98) (26725)
Table 3.1: Sample statistics. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Sample statis-
tics for all six market cells are reported under “All” to save space. Due to random-
ization, the statistics are similar across different market cells.
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delinquency. Their good credit quality can also be inferred from their high revolving
limit and low revolving balance. For a better description, a utilization rate is intro-
duced, defined as the ratio of revolving balance to its limit. The average utilization
rate for the whole sample is only 16% and for respondents only 27%. Good credit
risk generally receive many solicitations every month, especially when they have a
long credit history.
There are two puzzling phenomena observed in this dataset. The first puzzle
is that significantly more consumers in Market Cell A (4.9% for 6 months) accept
their offers than in Market Cell F (7.9% for 12 months). However, respondents keep
on borrowing on this card after six months. Based on ex post interest payment offer
F should have a higher response rate than offer A. This phenomenon is called “rank
reversal”. Consumer responses are recorded in the third column of Table (3.2).
Only about one percent consumers accept their credit card offers, which is also the
average response rate for the whole economy in the sample period.2 Significantly
more consumers accept the shorter offer A than the longer offers, E (6.9% for 12
months) and F, based on the T-test. This preference is suboptimal if one compares
the effective interest rates under different offers. The effective interest rate is the
annual interest rate respondents actually pay in each market cell, which equals the
ratio of the total interest payment to the total credit card debt and is shown in the
fifth column of Table (3.2). The effective interest rate is two percentage points lower
in Market Cell F than in Market Cell A and one percentage point lower in Market
Cell E. Since the average debt among borrowers is $2500, an average borrower in
Market Cell A pays $50 more interest than in Market Cell F and $25 than in Market
Cell E. To make sure this “rank reversal” phenomenon is not driven by outliers, we
calculate a “what if” interest payment for each respondent. We ask how much more
or less a member of Market Cell A would pay if her account were repriced according
to the formula of Market Cell F. Consumer behavior is assumed unchanged under
2According to BAI Global Inc., the response rate to solicitations is 1.4% in 1995.
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Market Number of Effective Rank by Effective Rank by
Cell Observations Response Rate Response Rate Interest Rate Interest Rate
A: 4.9% 99,886 1.073% 1 10.23% 3
6 months (0.00033)
B: 5.9% 99,872 0.903% 4 11.35% 4
6 months (0.00030)
C: 6.9% 99,869 0.687% 5 11.86% 5
6 months (0.00026)
D: 7.9% 99,880 0.645% 6 12.35% 6
6 months (0.00025)
E: 6.9% 99,890 0.992% 2 9.23% 2
9 months (0.00031)
F: 7.9% 99,860 0.944% 3 8.32% 1
12 months (0.00031)
T-TEST P-VALUES
A vs. E 7.23%
A vs. F 0.29%
Table 3.2: Empirical rank reversal. Standard deviations are in parentheses. the calculated
effective interest rate for market cell F (8.32%) slightly exceeded the stated APR of 7.9%
because some customers went delinquent and lost the introductory rate.
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Figure 3.1: Medians of borrowers’ debt over time for six market cells.
the new cell. 42% of them would save more than $10, 34% would save more than
$20 and 26% would save more than $40. Only 21% of respondents would do worse in
this exercise. One thing deserves mentioning is that consumers optimally prefer the
lower introductory interest rates among offers A, B(5.9% for 6 months), C(6.9% for
6 months) and D(7.9% for 6 months). This seems to suggest consumers are rational
and they can make the right choice when comparison involved is simple. This also
makes us more confident about the quality of this random experiment.
The second puzzle is that respondents do not switch again after the introduc-
tory offer expires even though their debts remain at the same level as before. We
observe a stable debt distribution over time among respondents who borrow. The
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median debt among borrowers stabilizes around $2000 in the twenty-four months,
shown in Fig.(3.1). The first quartile remains around $500 and the third quartile is
around $3500. The proportion of respondents who borrow does not decrease much
over time. As shown in Fig.(3.2), about 60% of respondents borrow during intro-
ductory periods and over 35% continues to carry balances after two years, which
is the same across all market cells. Majority of revolvers don’t switch! Of course,
this is not a puzzle if respondents have not received new offers after this one ex-
pires, however, this is impossible given the high volume of solicitations and the good
credit quality of respondents. Credit card companies will not send a consumer new
solicitations if she is either more than 60 days past-due or she declares a personal
bankruptcy. Among respondents, about 1% declare bankruptcy and 4% experience
a severe delinquency after accepting this card. Apparently, this cannot explain why
35% respondents don’t switch.
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In this chapter, we will analyze a multi-period model with complete information to
prove that “Rank Reversal” is impossible in an exponential model. Time consistent
agents will always choose a credit offer which requires the lowest interest payment.
However, this possibility exists for hyperbolic agents, both naive and sophisticated,
which is illustrated by a simple three-period model. Regardless of its simplicity, the
three-period model illustrates essential differences between exponential and hyper-
bolic models.
Besharov and Coffey (2003) conclude that hyperbolic time preferences are not
identifiable using financial rewards. The reward they consider is a specific type: give
a certain amount of money to agents at different dates, as is commonly observed
in laboratory experiments. The model below provides a specific example that hy-
perbolic discounting is identifiable, if the formula of financial rewards is carefully
designed. Our later estimation work based on a realistic dynamic model shows that
this identification still holds, when uncertainty and liquidity constraint are incorpo-
rated.
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4.1 Time preferences and Model Set-up
A general time preference formulation is adopted, which is first developed in O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2001). The representative agent has a current discount function of
{1, β0δ, β0δ2, ...}, where β0 represents “a bias for the present”— how much the agent
favors this period versus later periods and δ is a long-term discount factor.
Depending on the expected strategies, three types of hyperbolic models are
special cases of this general model, two of which have been commonly studied1. The
expectation of the strategies of future selves are determined by the expected discount
function, which is assumed to be {1, β1δ, β1δ2, ...} for all subsequent periods.When
β0 = β1 =β < 1, the agent (sophisticate hyperbolic) has a correct expectation about
her future. Self τ realizes that the discount factor between period t and period t+1
will become βδ when period t arrives. When β0 < β1 = 1, the agent is called a
naive hyperbolic agent since she has an incorrect expectation about her future. She
naively believes that she would behave herself (β1 = 1) from the next period on. In
between the sophisticate and naive hyperbolic agent, a partial naive agent can be
defined when 0 < β0 < β1 < 1. Such an agent underestimates the impatience she has
in the later periods like a naive agent. However, she anticipates a difference between
today’s desired patience and tomorrow’s actual one. In the following discussion, we
will focus on the first two types of hyperbolic models.
When β0 = β1 = 1, the general model is the standard exponential model.
Exponential agents have no special preference for current period and discount any
two equal-distance periods by the same discount factor δ. The four models are
summarized in Fig.(4.1).
1Naive and sophisticated hyperbolic models have been widely studied. Strotz (1956) and Phelps
and Pollak (1968) carefully distinguished the two assumptions, and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999)
studied different theoretic implications from these two. Laibson (1994, 1996, 1997) assumed con-
sumers are sophisticated. On the other hard, Akerlof (1991) adopted the naive hyperbolic assump-
tion.
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Figure 4.1: Generalized time preferences.
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The representative agent lives for T periods. At the beginning of period τ , she
chooses an optimal consumption level by maximizing a weighted sum of her utilities
from this period on:
max
Cτ
u (Cτ ) + β0
T∑
t=τ+1
δt−τu (Ct) , (4.1)
where the relative weights are determined by her current discount function. u (Ct)
is a concave instantaneous utility function.
The agent receives an income yt at period t and she lives in a complete market,
where she can borrow or save at the save gross interest rate rt and there is no credit
limit on her credit card.2
Ct = yt − At + rt−1At−1 (4.2)
She has an initial debt A0 at the beginning of period one. The boundary condition
is that she pays off all her debt in the last period, i.e. AT = 0. The interest rates
{rt}Tt=1 are determined by her credit card choice in the first period.
To solve for the optimal consumption, we use the backward induction method.
All earlier selves take later selves’ actions as an extra constraint, in addition to the
budget constraint. Let Vτ (Aτ−1) be the maximized value of the objective function
at period τ with the beginning asset Aτ−1.
Vτ (Aτ−1) = max
Cτ
u (Cτ ) + β0δṼτ+1 (Aτ ) (4.3)
The continuation payoff Ṽτ+1 (Aτ ) is computed from:









where Ĉτ+1 and Âτ+1 are chosen by self τ + 1. Since self τ has no control over self
τ + 1, she has to take the future self’s optimal plan as given. This explains the
2The complete market assumption is only for exposition purpose. We have relaxed this assump-
tion, where the agent can’t save at the credit card rate. The results are similar. This assumption
will be further relaxed in the later dynamic model, where the agent faces credit limit and the
borrowing and saving rates are not equal.
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because the desired discount factor between period τ + 1 and period τ + 2 is δ from
self τ ’s point of view. Ĉτ+1 and Âτ+1 are determined by the following optimization
problem where the expected future discount function is used:














is used in both Eq.4.4 and Eq.4.5, since self τ and self τ + 1 agree on
the expectation about period τ + 2 on. This is a special feature of quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, which greatly simplifies application.
4.2 “Rank Reversal”
As discussed in Chapter 3, “rank reversal” seems to suggest that consumers are time
inconsistent. Here we will use the complete information model to demonstrate that
the standard exponential model indeed cannot explain it. Only hyperbolic models,
where agents are time inconsistent, can rationalize “rank reversal”.
Suppose there are two introductory offers L (rL, ΓL) and M (rM , ΓM) in the first
period, where ri and Γi are the introductory interest rate and duration respectively
and i ∈ {L, M}, assuming rL < rL and ΓM < ΓM . Offer L provides a lower
introductory interest rate, however, for fewer periods. The representative agent
ranks the two credit offers, based on the optimal utility she would receive under
each card offer. To simplify the model, there are no more new offers in later periods.
Definition 1: “Rank Reversal” occurs if the optimal utility under offer L is
larger than under M, however the agent would have paid less interest or received
more interest income under M, assuming the asset choice under L.






































is the present discounted value of corresponding interest income, where i, j ∈ {L, M}.
The “Rank Reversal” essentially means that the agent’s preference order in
the utility space is different from that in the financial payment space. She prefers
the short offer even though she would have paid less interest (received more interest
income) for the same debt (asset) path with the longer offer.
















































We will use Lemma 1 to prove an important proposition. Proof of Lemma 1 is
straightforward, applying Eq. (4.2).
4.2.1 “Rank Reversal” Impossible for Exponen-
tial Agents
Before prove the proposition, we will first layout two definitions and prove one
Lemma.
Definition 2: A game with commitment is one in which self 1 chooses an optimal
consumption plan according to her preference, and all later selves are required to
follow the plan. Self 1’s problem, given an offer i, is the following:
max{Cτ}Tτ=1



















Definition 3: A game without commitment is one in which self τ chooses her
optimal consumption given the initial asset, Aτ−1, and she has no control over future
selves’ choices. The only way she may influence future behavior is by changing the
state variable Aτ . The problem is defined as:
Vτ (Aτ−1) = maxCτ u (Cτ ) + β0δṽτ+1 (Aτ )
s.t. Cτ = yτ − Aτ + rτ−1Aτ−1
where ṽτ+1 (Aτ ) is the expected continuation utility.
The essential difference between the two games is their choice sets. The choice
set for the game without commitment is only a subset of that for the game with
commitment. The budget constraint is the only constraint in the game with com-
mitment. However, the game without commitment has an additional constraint
which is her future behavior. Some financially feasible plan may not be her choice
because its implementation issue.
Lemma 2: For an exponential model, solutions are the same for the game with or
without commitment.
The lemma is true due to the Principle of Optimality, Bellman (1957). The
Principle of Optimality establishes the equivalence between solutions to two prob-





s.t. xt+1 ∈ Γ (xt) , t = 0, 1, 2, ...
x0 ∈ X given.
(4.6)
It is easy to see that the consumption game with commitment is a special case of
the first problem. The second problem is
v (x) = max
y∈Γ(x)
F (x, y) + δv (y) , all x ∈ X.
The above consumption game without commitment belongs to its class. Therefore
Lemma 2 is just a direct application of optimality.
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Proposition: Exponential agents will never exhibit “ Rank Reversal”.
Proof:
Consumers’ credit card usage is best described as a game without commit-
ment defined in Definition 3. For exponential agents, the choice is also optimal for
the game with commitment given Lemma 2. Hence the asset path should provide













, the optimal consumption path under L is also feasible under
M as shown in Lemma 1. The optimal choice under M should be better than that
under offer L, i.e. offer M should have been chosen instead of L. Therefore, it can-












while offer L is
preferred to M.
4.2.2 “Rank Reversal” Possible for Hyperbolic Agents
However, the “Rank Reversal” is possible in hyperbolic models. The key reason is
that hyperbolic time preference is not consistent. Some consumption plans are not
optimal in the future even though they are both financially feasible and preferred
in the first period. Therefore, it is possible that the chosen consumption plan which
is optimal in every period may incur higher costs than those plans.
We analytically solve the above model, where T = 3 and u (Ct) = C
1−ρ
t /(1−ρ).
The optimal asset decision is the following:
A1 =



































where X = (β1δr2)
− 1
ρ . Aexp2 is the expected behavior of self 2 from self 1’s point of
view and Areal2 is the real behavior of self 2. The two are the same in the sophisticated
hyperbolic model, where β0 = β1. Given A1, A
real
2 ≤ Aexp2 , since dF/dβ > 0 3 and
β1 ≥ β0, where
F =







In another words, self 1 underestimate (overestimate) her debt (saving) at period 1
when the inequality is true.
Given all other parameters, does a naive hyperbolic agent borrow more than a
sophisticated consumer in the first period? Intuitively the naive agent should borrow
more since she doesn’t expect herself to borrow so much in the second period. On the
other hand, the sophisticated consumer should accommodate future overspending
by borrow less at the first period. Actually the answer depends on ρ. When ρ < 1,
dA1/dβ1 > 0, i.e. the naive consumer saves more. When ρ > 1, dA1/dβ1 < 0,
i.e. the naive consumer borrows more. When ρ = 1, they behave the same. The
intuition is that when ρ > 1 the agent really would like to spread consumption over
time. Therefore a sophisticated self 1 would like to borrow less to accommodate her
borrowing in the second period. However when ρ < 1 the self 1 doesn’t care much
about smoothing consumption. If she knows that self 2 will spend too much, she
would leave less wealth to self 2. The mathematical proof is in the Appendix.
Another interesting finding from the above analytic solutions is that the naive
model behaves observationally similar to the sophisticated model when the present
bias is small (β0 → 1). The difference between the two models explodes when
β0 → 0. Given A1, both naive and sophisticated agents will borrow (save) according
to Areal2 . The difference in A1 is from Z. dZ/dβ1 is a function of (β0)
−1/ρ. When
β0 → 0, (β0)−1/ρ → ∞, since ρ > 0. Therefore dZ/dβ1 → ∞ and dA1/dβ1 → ∞.
On the other hand, when β0 → 1, so is β1 since β1 ≥ β0. dZ/dβ1 is a function of
(β1 − 1). Therefore dZ/dβ1 → 0 as (β1 − 1) → 0.
3All derivatives are evaluated in Appendix.
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We will use numerical examples to illustrate some other interesting findings,
which are not easy to see from the analytic solution. Assume ρ = 2, y1 = y2 = y3 = 1
and A0 = 0. Offer L carries an interest rate of 5% for the first period and 20% for
the second period. Offer M has a flat interest rate schedule: 10% for both periods.
Fig.(4.2) plots the rank reversal region (the shaded area) in β and δ space, for
sophisticated and naive models. For both models there are only two preference
parameters. For the sophisticated agent β1 = β0 = β. The naive agent has a β1 = 1,
β0 = β. Apparently, there is no rank reversal when β = 1, which is the exponential
model. However, there exists a wide rank reversal area for hyperbolic models.
A naive agent exhibits “rank reversal” because she underestimates her future
borrowing. For example, suppose β = 0.82 and δ = 1. In the first period, she prefers
offer L because she expects that A1 = −0.0207 and Aexp2 = 0.0312. However, when
the second period arrives she gives in to her instantaneous desire and borrows again,
Areal2 = −0.0135. Base on her actual behavior, she has made a suboptimal choice in
the first period. However, her decision is optimal based on her expectation.
A sophisticated agent does not behave suboptimally because of incorrect ex-
pectations, rather because she tries to align her future behavior with her current
preference. Continue to suppose β = 0.82 and δ = 1. If she can commit to her
future behavior, she will choose A1 = −0.0207 and A2 = 0.0312. However, she an-
ticipates that this plan will not be followed in the second period. Still she decides to
borrow less in period one (A1 = −0.0199 ) to accommodate tomorrow’s borrowing
(A2 = −0.0131). Based on her reduced first-period debt, the interest payment under
L is more than M. However it is not optimal to choose M since this consumption
plan will not be implementable if M is chosen. Given A1 = −0.0199, she will borrow
much more under offer M in the second period (A2 = −0.0347), which is worse from
her first period’s point of view.
Given any δ, a smaller β will be more likely in the rank reversal region. As
the difference between the long term desired discount factor (δ) and the short term
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Figure 4.2: Rank reverse area of Sophisticated and Naive Hyperbolic Agents
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temptation (βδ) becomes larger, an naive agent’s underestimation error is larger
and more desperate the sophisticated agent wants to constrain herself. Both will
lead to financially suboptimal behavior.
Only when β is really small, less than 0.8 in this numerical example, rank
reversal region for sophisticated agents separates from that of naive agents. The
same is true for asset choices. As shown above, whether the agent recognizes self-
control problem or not makes a behavioral difference only when the self-control





A dynamic model, which captures consumer decision problem in the market exper-
iment more realistically, is presented in this chapter. Compared with the previous
model, this dynamic model has four realistic institution features. First, consumers
face uninsurable income risk, both transitory and persistent income shocks. Sec-
ond, consumers receive new introductory offers from other credit card companies
every period. Third, receiving new offers is an probabilistic event. Consumers have
a rational assessment of what is the probability of new offers. Fourth, consumers
have a time varying switching cost every period. This captures different perceived
costs involved in switching. The difference may due to the variance of consumers’
personal time schedule or the variance of their emotional status.
All realistic features are added to explore the possibility of explaining “rank
reversal” by random shocks. Consumers’ preference for the short offer A may be
optimal based on their expectation about future, though not according to the true
realization. For example some consumers may have chosen the short offer under
the expectation that they will switch out after six months. However, they fail to
transfer because they are too busy.
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5.1 Model Setup
The model is inspired by standard “buffer-stock” life-cycle models, Carroll (1992,
1997a), and Deaton (1991). This model is set in discrete time. One period in the
model represents one quarter in the real world. The consumer lives for T periods.
The boundary condition is that the consumer consumes all her cash-on-hand at the
final period.1 The consumer receives stochastic income every period. She can either
save in her saving account or borrow on credit cards to smooth her consumption.
However, she is liquidity constrained in two aspects. First, she is restricted in her
ability to borrow. The upper bound is the total credit limit of her credit cards,
denoted as L̄, which is exogenously given. However nothing prevents her from
accumulating liquid assets. Second, she faces different interest rates depending on
whether she is savings (rs) or borrowing (r), where r > rs, and r is the regular
interest rate on credit cards.
The consumer can reduce the interest payment on her debt if she accepts an
introductory offer. At the beginning of period 1, the credit card company that con-
ducted this market experiment, denoted as Red, offers the consumer an introductory
interest rate rr < r with a duration τ r periods, and a credit limit l. The consumer
may also receive credit card solicitations from other credit card companies which
are not observed in this dataset. These unobservable companies are simplified as
one company, Blue. Blue provides an introductory interest rate rb < r with an in-
troductory duration of τ b and a credit limit also l. The consumer’s total credit limit
L̄ is held constant even after accepting a new offer to simplify computation. This is
an innocuous assumption since respondents have so much unused credit limit: the
average debt is only $2,000 while the average credit limit is $6,000 on this observed
card and $15,000 on other cards. In every period, the consumer receives a Blue offer
1The model is chosen to have finite horizon because the standard contraction map theory fails
for sophisticated hyperbolic models. See Laibson (1997,1998) and for more details. We choose T
large enough, so that results will not be sensitive to it.
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with a probability q, which is positive and finite if the consumer has no existing
introductory offer from Blue, otherwise zero.2
Simultaneously with the acceptance of credit card offer(s), the consumer de-
cides how much to consume at the beginning of period t. There is a switching
cost, kt, associated with accepting every introductory offer. The switching cost is
indexed by t because it is assumed that the consumer has a time-varying switching
cost. This assumption is required because respondents with similar credit card debt
fail to switch after this red offer expires. Simulation results show that respondents
will definitely switch again after the offer expires if the following three conditions
hold. The first is that their credit card debt remains the same. Second, they have
fixed switching costs. Third, there are new offers available. This is true for both
hyperbolic and exponential agents. As mentioned before, respondents must have
some other offers available, since their credit status is good and there are numerous
credit card solicitations in the sample period. The only possible explanation is that
consumer switching costs are changing over time. Respondents of this experiment
accepted the offers due to their low realized switching costs at the time of solicita-
tion. However, their mean switching costs are much higher, which can be partially
inferred from the low response rate (1%). This high mean will keep the majority
of respondents from switching a second time after the introductory periods. The
switching cost captures the (expected) time and effort required in filling out an
application for a new card. It is assumed that there is no extra cost for transfer-
ring balance after the consumer accepts a new offer. Once she accepts introductory
offer(s), she has immediate access to the credit.
The consumer in period t maximizes a weighted sum of utilities from current
2This assumption effectively excludes that consumers have more than one introductory offer
from Blue. We believe relaxing it will only complicate the problem with little benefit.
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period on which is summarized in the following Eq.(5.1).










, for t = 1,








, for t ≥ 2.
(5.1)
Eq.(5.1) is similar to Eq.(4.3) in the previous section. The instantaneous utility is the
sum of the consumption utility and the disutility (the switching cost) from accepting
an introductory offer. Ct and d
b
t are the consumption choice and the decision to
accept an introductory offer from Blue at period t respectively. dr1 is the decision to
accept the Red offer at period 1. kt is the current switching cost. The consumption
function is assumed to be CRRA and ρ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Λt+1 denotes the vector of state variables:
{







is cash-on-hand at the beginning of period t+1, which is a sum of stochastic income,
yt+1, and wealth, At+1. ϕt+1 is the realized persistent income shock at period t+1,
which will be discussed in more detail later. kt+1 is the realized switching cost
in period t+1. τ bt+1 and Γ
r
t+1 denote the number of introductory periods left on
the Blue and Red card at period t + 1 respectively. st+1 denotes whether a new
introductory offer is received at period t + 1. The expectation is taken with respect
to the distributions of yt+1, ϕt+1, kt+1 and st+1.












t+1 are the behavior of the expected self t+1. Self t take the expected self
t+1’s behavior as given so that there is not ‘max′ operator in Eq.5.2. The discount
factor between period t and t + 1 is δ because the relative discount factor from self
t’s point of view is βδ2/βδ = δ. Ṽt+1,t+2 is used instead of Ṽt,t+2 because they are
the same. Self t and self t + 1 have the same expectation about periods later than
t + 1. This special feature of quasi-hyperbolic models makes it easier to compute.
Ĉτ+1 and d̂
b
τ+1 are determined by the following optimization problem where
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the expected future discount function is used:
V ∗τ+1 (Aτ ) = maxbCτ+1, bdbτ+1
Ĉ1−ρt+1







This consumer problem is solved numerically by backward induction. Iterate Eq.(5.3)
and Eq.(5.2) to generate the expected continuation utility function Ṽt,t+1. Combine





5.2 Numerical Simulation and Model Pre-
diction
In this section we use some numerical simulations to provide intuition about the
model behavior. The same simulation strategy applies to estimate related param-
eters in next chapter. In order to simulate the model we calibrate a subset of
parameters, such as the income process, outside credit card offers. The calibration
choices are discussed in details at the next section.
It is a well-documented observation that sophisticated hyperbolic models have
irregular policy functions as the short-term discount factor, β, becomes smaller.
(Krusell and Smith 2000, Harris and Laibson 2001a). The irregularity is due to
strategic actions between selves at different periods. Due to time inconsistent pref-
erence, an early self desires different actions from a later self than what the later
self will actually behave. Therefore, the early self will behave strategically, trying
to align the later self’s behavior as close as possible to what her wish is.
Fig.(5.1) plots the asset choice At+1 as a function of cash-on-hand at period t,
Xt, for different βs. The left graph is for the naive hyperbolic model and the right
is for the sophisticated hyperbolic model. The asset function of the naive model is
regular for all β values, since naive agents don’t recognize time inconsistency. How-
ever when β = 0.5, the asset function of the sophisticated model is a step function,
which is quite irregular. If converting asset functions into consumption functions, the
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Figure 5.1: Policy functions. The asset choice At+1 is a function of cash-on-hand at
period t, Xt, for different βs.
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Figure 5.2: Policy functions. The asset choice At+1 is a function of cash-on-hand at
period t, Xt, when β=0.5.
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regular asset function corresponds to a concave, monotonic consumption function.
However the step function will generate a non-monotonic consumption function.
When β is close to 1, the asset functions for the naive model are similar to those
for the sophisticated model, consistent with our finding in the complete information
model. When β = 0.5, the two models behave qualitatively different. However, they
have a similar mean. The sophisticated asset function varies around the naive one
which is shown in Fig.(5.2).
Can random shocks explain “Rank Reversal”? Simulation results reveal that
the conflict between preference for the short offer A and later low switching is still
inexplicable in the exponential model. In the top panel of Table (5.1), exponential
agents’ response to offer A and F are reported for different discount factors δ, given
other parameters. The more patient the agents are, the higher response rate to
the short offer A compared with that to offer F. Patient consumers expect that
their debt will be short-lived so that the shorter offer A is better. On the contrary,
agents are more likely to accept the longer offer when they become impatient. At
the same time, impatient respondents will be more likely to stay with the card after
the interest rate jumps to 16%. The corresponding average debt for borrowers in
Market Cell A are shown in Fig.(5.3). The time consistent agents always prefer
an offer incurring the least cost. The short offer costs less only if the debt declines
rapidly over time. Under that scenario, earlier interest saving can compensate for the
later higher interest rate. Therefore there doesn’t exit a δ, which can simultaneously
explain the two phenomena.
However, there exists β such that both sophisticated and naive models predict
that agents prefer the short offer and they keep on borrowing on the card for a long
period. Simulation results for the sophisticated and naive are reported in Table
(5.1), Fig.(5.4) and Fig.(5.5), where β adopts different values and δ is assumed to be
fixed. When β is very low, like 0.7, the longer offer is preferred by the sophisticated
hyperbolic agent because it saves much more interest than the short one, which
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Figure 5.3: Simulated mean debt among borrowers in market cell A for the expo-
nential model.
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Figure 5.4: Simulated mean debt among borrowers in market cell A for the sophis-
ticated hyperbolic model.
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Figure 5.5: Simulated mean debt among borrowers in market cell A for the naive
hyperbolic model. This is the actual borrowing not expected.
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Exponential
δ 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.9999
A 152 72 53 41
F 476 100 71 36
Sophisticated
β 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.95
A 98 80 54 47
F 133 72 41 49
Naive
β 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.95
A 133 90 59 47
F 127 91 57 45
Table 5.1: Response rates for different time preferences. Response is based on 10,000 simu-
lations. β,δ are discount factors. δ = 0.9999 for both hyperbolic models. Other parameters
are assumed to be the the same for all three models. k, the switching cost parameter, is
assumed to be 0.03. Mean of A1 is 5000 and variance is 8e6, which is liquid assets at the
time of solicitation.
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outweighs the benefit of constraining future selves. However, when β is moderate,
like 0.8, the sophisticated hyperbolic agent would like the short offer which will save
them money in the near future and constrain them to borrow less in the future.
On the other hand, the naive hyperbolic agent always respond more to the short
offer even when β = 0.7. She doesn’t plan to borrow after current period because
her desired discount rate δ = 0.9999 in this simulation. Fig.(5.5) plots the actual
borrowing for the naive agent, not her plan. The simulated debt path for β = 0.8
is qualitatively the same as what is observed in the experiment for both hyperbolic
models. Only when β = 0.7, the naive model behaves significantly different from





In this chapter, we will apply the dynamic model to the empirical data and estimate
related parameters.
6.1 Estimation Strategy
To estimate the above dynamic model by using Maximum Likelihood method, the
objective function involved is too complicated to compute. There is endogenous
sampling at the first period: only 1% accepted the credit card solicitation and
we only observe respondents’ subsequent borrowing behavior. To account for this
endogeneity, the likelihood function will involve high dimensional integration which
is computational prohibitive. To circumvent this problem, the parameters of the
model are estimated by matching empirical moments with simulated moments from
the dynamic model. The estimation method used is Simulated Minimum Distance
Estimator (SMD), proposed in Hall and Rust (2002). 1 This method accounts for
the endogenous selection with the least computation cost.
The SMD estimator is the parameter value θ which minimizes the distance
1This method is similar to Simulated Moments Estimator (SME) of McFadden (1989) and Pakes
and Pollard (1989).
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between a set of simulated and sample moments. The sample moments are calcu-
lated based on censored observations, respondents. Consumer behavior for a given
trial value θ is simulated and similar moments are calculated based on simulated
respondents, who are censored in exactly the same way as the empirical data. Even
though various moments based on censored data may be biased, the SMD estimator
is consistent as proved in Hall and Rust (2002).








which is the mean among the sample and θ∗ is the underlying true parameters . The







The simulated minimum distance estimator θ̂ is defined by:
θ̂ = arg min
θ∈Θ
(h (θ) − h (θ∗))′ W (h (θ) − h (θ∗))
In this study, total 216 moments are used, 36 for each market cell. The 36 mo-
ments are the response rate plus five debt distribution statistics for seven quarters:
proportion of consumers who borrow, mean, median, forty and sixty percentiles
among borrowers. The debt statistics for the first quarter is omitted because they
underestimates respondents’ debt. This underestimation is because it takes about
2-3 months for respondents to accumulate debt on this card. This time lag is not
modeled in the dynamic model.
Hall and Rust (2002) proves that the optimal weighting matrix W ∗ is






∗) − h (θ∗)) (hi (θ∗) − h (θ∗))′
The problem with the optimal weighting matrix is that it doesn’t give enough weight
to the response rates. Among the total 216 moments only 6 moments are response
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rates so that the relative weight on debt path is much larger than on response rates.
This is not reasonable because the response rates directly reveal preferences of the
full sample. The debt path only conveys information about 1% of the sample. The
correct weighting matrix should put a much larger weight on the response rates.
Hence, we create our weighting matrix which puts 80% weight on response rates
and 20% on debt path. Among six market cells, 1/3 is on cell A, 1/3 is on F and
the remaining 1/3 is equally distributed among B, C, D, E.














Λ1 = ∇Eh (θ∗)′ · W · ∇Eh (θ∗)
Λ2 = ∇Eh (θ∗)′ W · Ω (h (θ∗)) · W · ∇Eh (θ∗)
W is the weighting matrix, Ω (h (θ∗)) is the variance matrix of the moments, and
∇Eh (θ∗) = ∂Eh(θ∗)
∂θ∗
. The factor 2 is to account for simulation error. If analytic
model moments are used a factor of 1 should be used instead.


























I −∇Eh (θ∗) Λ−11 ∇Eh (θ∗)′ · W
]
.
To make estimation feasible, we calibrate a subset of parameters, using related
literature and our dataset, and make assumptions about exogenous variables’ distri-
butions. First is the income process, which is modeled as a time series with changes
in two possible states: a good state and a bad state. The persistent income shock
is captured by a two-state Markov process, ϕt ∈ {1, 0}, where 1 and 0 represent
the good and bad state respectively. The method was introduced in Laibson et al.
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(2000) which significantly reduces the computational cost. The transition proba-
bilities between the two states is governed by the conditional probabilities matrix:
{pi,j}, where i, j ∈ {1, 0}, pi,j = prob(ϕt = i/ϕt−1 = j). In a given state, income
is a random draw from a lognormal distribution, LN (ηj, εj), where j ∈ {g, b}.
The lognormal distribution captures the transitory income shock. Its distribution
parameters depend on whether it is in the good state or the bad state. To get rea-
sonable estimates for the income distribution, we use estimates from Laibson et al.
(2000) as a starting point. We describe the detailed calibration of income process
in Appendix.
We assume consumer switching cost, kt, is an identical and independent ran-
dom draw from a uniform distribution with a range [0, k]. We assume, at the time
of solicitation, consumer liquid asset/credit card debt follows a normal distribution
with a mean of µ and a variance of ε2.
We calibrate the total credit limit, L, and the credit limit for each credit card
(recall that they are assumed the same), l, using the information in the dataset.
The calibrated L are $15,000 and l is $6, 000. In addition, the regular interest rate
for credit cards r is assumed to be 1.16%, and the saving interest rate rs = 1.01%.
The relative risk aversion coefficient ρ is assumed to be 2.
The introductory interest rates and durations of the Red offers, rr and τr are
given in the experiment dataset. However, we don’t observe introductory offers
consumers received in subsequent periods. We assume the duration for the Blue
offer is 6 months, which is the typical duration in the company we observed. The
interest rate on the Blue offer is assumed to be 8%.
We assume consumers have a probability of 90% to receive Blue offers. As
argued before, we believe respondents should receive new offers every quarter with
a probability of almost one in the sample period. It is assumed 1% consumers have
an ongoing Blue offer at the time of the Red solicitation which was the average
response rate to credit card solicitations at the sample period.
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Given the calibrated parameters and the distribution assumptions, we estimate
remaining parameters by SMD. The estimated parameters are the time discount
factors, β and δ, the switch cost distribution parameter k, and the parameters of
the liquid asset distribution at the beginning of period 1, the mean µ and the variance
ε2. We estimate parameters for three models: exponential, naive and sophisticated
hyperbolic. For the exponential model, β = 1. For the naive model, β1 = 1 and
β0 = β is estimated. For the sophisticated model, β1 = β0 = β. Their standard
errors are calculated according to Eq.(6.1).
6.2 Estimation Results
Estimation results for the dynamic model are reported in Table (6.1). “Goodness-
of-Fit” is the weighted distance between empirical moments and simulated mo-
ments. Allowing for hyperbolic time preferences significantly improves fit, reducing
the distance by more than half. As explained in the previous chapter, the failure
of exponential discounting is expected because the exponential model cannot si-
multaneously explain consumer response to different offers and respondents’ later
borrowing behavior. Even after random shocks are incorporated into the model,
time consistent consumers on average exhibit consistent behavior. Only by allowing
consumers to have time inconsistent preferences, can the model prediction match
the empirical data.
An inspection of Table (6.1) shows that all parameters are estimated pre-
cisely. The parameters for both hyperbolic models are very close, while those of
the exponential model are quite different. As shown in the previous chapter, the
sophisticated model is similar as the naive model when β is close to 1. There is
only a small quantitative difference: given β and δ, naive consumers borrow more
and are more eager to accept new offers. Therefore, the naive model needs a larger






δ 0.9999 0.9999 0.9999
(0.00201) (0.0017) (0.00272)
k 0.02927 0.0326 0.1722
$293 $326 $1, 722
(0.00127) (0.00139) (0.0155)
µ 1.0088 0.9584 1.5836
$5, 044 $4, 792 $7, 918
(0.0367) (0.0277) (0.0517)
ε2 0.831 0.8167 4.278
$8, 310, 000 $8, 167, 000 $42, 780, 000
(0.0439) (0.0373) (0.0535)
Goodness-of-Fit 2.5202e − 4 2.8183e − 4 6.0534e − 4
χ2(211) 6110 5627 13975
Table 6.1: Estimated parameters. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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from switching out. The β estimates match with Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman
(2004), whose β = 0.7.
In Table (6.1) the switching cost parameter k is transformed into a dollar
value. k measures a utility value in the dynamic model. To interprete it intuitively,
an approximate dollar value is calculated, dividing k by the marginal utility at the
average consumption level among the solicited population. For example, k = 0.0292
corresponds to a dollar value of $292. In another word, the mean of switching cost
is $146 which belongs to a uniform distribution [0, k]. The liquid asset distribution
parameters, µ and ε2, are also transformed to facilitate estimation. Both estimated
values and their corresponding dollar values are reported in Table (6.1).
Exponential consumers are estimated to have a much larger switching cost k,
a larger mean µ and a larger variance ε2. Such parameters are required to better
match the debt path over time. To match preference for the shorter offer, exponential
consumers have to have a large δ, 0.9999, as shown in the above simulation. Such
patient exponential consumers are more likely to borrow under 16% APR only when
they have a higher switching cost. With a higher switching cost, µ and ε2 have to
change accordingly to match the magnitude of average debt and response rates.
All three models are decisively rejected by the over-identification test. However
hyperbolic models are rejected to a lesser degree compared with the exponential
model. The failure of this test is expected because of the large sample size, about
100,000 observations contributing to each moment. As the sample size becomes so
large, any small misspecification will result in a rejection. Regardless of rejection,
hyperbolic models still predict better than the exponential model.
Consumer responses to six different introductory offers are shown in Table
(6.2). All three models match the response rates because we put a large weight on
this moment. Hyperbolic models are better than the exponential model because
they also predict that a higher response rate to the short offer A.
In Fig.(6.1), the predicted debt paths of Market Cells A, E and F implied by
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Figure 6.1: Simulated debt moments. The triangle line is the empirical data. The
solid line, the dash line and the dotted line are predicted by the exponential, so-
phisticated and naive hyperbolic models respectively.
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Market Cell Total Empirical Naive Sophisticated Exponential
Hyperbolic Hyperbolic
A: 4.9% 6 months 99,886 1073 1013 1001 951
B: 5.9% 6 months 99,872 903 911 888 845
C: 6.9% 6 months 99,869 687 810 793 764
D: 7.9% 6 months 99,880 645 701 652 672
E: 6.9% 9 months 99,890 992 997 980 1005
F: 7.9% 12 months 99,860 944 978 947 1047
Table 6.2: Simulated response in six market cells for hyperbolic and exponential models.
the three models are compared with empirical data. Comparing to the exponential
model, the two hyperbolic models match the debt path much better, which is the
reason why their “Goodness-of-Fit” statistics are much lower. Despite a very large
switching cost, the debt path predicted by the exponential model declines much
faster than the data. Exponential consumers borrow too much at the beginning,
an average of $3500 compared with $2700 empirically, and too little at the end, an
average of $900 instead of $2600 empirically. Such a debt path is predicted because
that exponential consumers are so patient (δ = 0.9999) that they will pay off their
debt even without switching. However a large δ is required to match consumer
preference for the short offer.
The magnitude of k deserves some discussion. Is the average switching cost
$150 outrageously high? The magnitude of k here is consistent with anecdotal
evidence in the credit card market. Credit card issuers spend lots of money to
acquire one customer. Credit card companies send out billions of solicitations every
year and 99% of them end up in trash cans. Many solicitations offer a very low
introductory rate, as low as 0%. The behavior of issuers will only be rational if
majority consumers don’t switch. In contrast to low acceptance rates, the average
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credit card debt is $9000 among U.S. households with at least one credit card.2 This
expensive inertia directly implies high disutility that consumers associate with card
application, which is captured by switching cost (k) in the dynamic model.
A close inspection of Fig.(6.1) reveals that there are two features of the data,
which are not explained by the hyperbolic models. First, there are only 65% re-
spondents borrowed during introductory duration. However both hyperbolic models
predict that almost all respondents borrow at the beginning. Second, the predicted
debt distribution is more concentrated than the empirical data, because there are
significantly more respondents borrow more than the sixty percentile, about 75%.
We suspect this is due to the restrictive assumption of homogenous consumers. We
observe that there are 20% respondents are convenience users, who never borrowed
even in the introductory period. Their time preferences must be different from those
revolvers, who borrow even under 16% interest rate. In the future research, we plan
to explore the effect of consumer heterogeneity.
6.3 Robustness
In this section, we check the robustness of the above findings. First, can a time
consistent model match empirical moments as well as hyperbolic models if it has an
extra parameter β? To answer this question, we estimate a model whose discounting
function is {1, βδ, βδ2, ...} at period 1 (solicitation time) and {1, δ, δ2, ...} at all later
periods. This model is time consistent because the desired discount rate is the
same (δ) between any two consecutive periods. But it has a one-time present bias
factor at the card acceptance stage which may generate preference for the low-rate
short offer A. The estimation result for this model is reported in the first column
of Table (6.3). It is apparent that the extra parameter fails to improve fitness
significantly. Actually, the optimal parameter β is almost equal to 1. It seems that
2Based on data from cardweb.com.
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time inconsistent preference is the key in order to match the empirical data, not one
extra parameter.
Secondly, do the above findings still hold if Market Cell A is ignored? The
above estimation critically depends on the assumption that consumers behave the
same no matter which market cell they belong to. One possible criticism is that
consumers in Market Cell A may not be comparable to consumers in other cells
because offer A (4.9% for 6 months) is an exceptionally good offer. The ordinary
offer from the issuer is B (5.9% for 6 months). To address this concern we estimate
the dynamic model based on consumer behavior on other five market cells. The es-
timation results are shown in the last three columns of Table (6.3). Still hyperbolic
models match empirical moments better than the exponential model. When cell A
is omitted, time inconsistency has reduced, therefore the difference between expo-
nential and hyperbolic models has decreased. Specifically, the Goodness-of-Fit of
the exponential model has improved because a lower δ is required to match response
rates. And a lower δ improves prediction on debt path. The significant change for
hyperbolic models are that a larger β is needed to match response rates because the
time inconsistency is reduced.
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Consistent β Sophisticated Naive Exponential
Hyperbolic Hyperbolic
Extra Parameter Yes No No No
A is excluded No Yes Yes Yes
β 0.9999 0.8034 0.8246
(0.002967) (0.00253) (0.00255)
δ 0.9999 0.9998 0.9999 0.9726
(0.002972) (0.00133) (0.00124) (0.000962)
k 0.1722 0.0292 0.03266 0.0825
$1, 722 $292 $326 $825
(0.0115) (0.000945) (0.00129) (0.00358)
µ 1.5836 1.0072 0.9752 1.4534
$7, 918 $5, 036 $4, 876 $7, 267
(0.0422) (0.0305) (0.0346) (0.02997)
ε2 4.278 0.8377 0.8296 2.1854
$42, 780, 000 $8, 377, 000 $8, 296, 000 $21, 854, 000
(0.0437) (0.0393) (0.0514) (0.055)
Goodness-of-Fit 6.04892e − 4 2.50492e − 4 2.63716e − 4 4.90161e − 4





This thesis applies three different models of intertemporal choices to explain con-
sumer behavior in a credit card market experiment, exponential, sophisticated hy-
perbolic and naive hyperbolic. From this unique dataset, two contradictory phe-
nomena are observed. First, at the time of solicitation, consumers prefer an offer
with a lower introductory interest rate (4.9%) and a shorter duration (6 months),
to an offer with a higher introductory interest rate (7.9%) but a longer duration (12
months). The relative preference is puzzling since consumers would benefit more,
ex post, from the longer introductory offer. We call it “rank reversal”. Second, the
majority of respondents do not switch out after the expiration of their introductory
offers, even though their debt remains at the same level as when they accept the
offer. This is puzzling because there are so many other offers available and the
benefit of switching is as large as before.
We first use a multi-period complete information model to analytically prove
that standard exponential consumers will not exhibit “rank reversal”. Exponential
consumers always prefer the credit card offer which incurs the least interest pay-
ment. However, if consumers are assumed to have time inconsistent preferences,
such as the newly developed hyperbolic discounting, “rank reversal” is not a puzzle
any more. We have explored two extreme types of hyperbolic discounting: naive and
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sophisticated. Both of them can explain the data, however the underlying stories are
different. Naive consumers mistakenly prefer the shorter offer because they under-
estimate their future borrowing. Sophisticated consumers prefer the shorter offer
because it offers a self-commitment device. Before this experiment, the standard
laboratory experiments try to solicit consumer time preferences by offering them
financial rewards at different time. Besharov and Coffey (2003), however, shows
that this can’t identify time inconsistent preferences because both consistent and
inconsistent consumers would behave the same – maximize their wealth. The market
experiment studied here provides a unique angle to identify hyperbolic discounting.
Can an exponential model with realistic random shocks explain the above
two puzzles? To address this question, an incomplete information dynamic model
is developed, in which consumers have both time consistent (exponential) and time
inconsistent (hyperbolic) preferences and they are subject to realistic random shocks,
such as income shocks. The estimation results based on this dynamic model show
that still only the hyperbolic model can explain two phenomena simultaneously.
The exponential model fails because that time consistent consumers would always
prefer an offer which on average provides the lowest interest payment.
Another interesting finding is that when the present bias factor β is close to
1, the two hyperbolic models, sophisticated and naive, behave similarly. We analyt-
ically illustrate this in a three-period complete information model. We also empiri-
cally observe this from the incomplete information dynamic model. This finding is
interesting because the two models describe two fundamentally different consumers.
Naive consumers fail to recognize they have time inconsistency problem. However,
sophisticated consumers forsee their self-control problems. Naive models are as easy
to compute as exponential models. On the other hand, sophisticated models may
have multiple equilibria as proved in Krusell (2003). One direct application of this
finding is that future research can use naive models to approximate sophisticated
models if no welfare analysis involved, because the empirically relevant β is close to
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1.
A time-varying switching cost is required to explain why respondents don’t
switch again after introductory offers expire. Accepting one offer only implies that
respondents have low switching costs at the time of acceptance. Most of the time
consumers face much higher switching costs. Therefore majority of them fail to
switch a second time even though their debt remains large.
Consumer time consistency is an important question since different models
have vastly different normative implications. For example a consumer piles up debt
on her credit cards. She may do so because the pleasure of consumption today
outweighs the interest payment tomorrow. Or she may do so because she has an
impulse to overspend which is not valued from the long-run perspective, like the
sophisticated agent. The two stories have different public policy implications. The
first consumer just borrows the right amount. However, the second consumer would
like somebody to bind her hands. It is crucial to distinguish between the two hy-
potheses.
Consumer behavior identified here also facilitates the understanding of com-
petition anomalies in the credit card market. Instead of lowering interest rates,
credit card issuers fiercely compete with each other by sending out “junk mail”.
99% of direct solicitation mails end up in trash cans. Credit card companies offer
ridiculously low introductory interest rates to acquire new customers, like 0% for 12
months. Nevertheless the post interest rate sticks around the prime rate plus 9.99%.
All these strategies are optimal only if consumers don’t switch. This study not only
provides individual-level evidence of this inertia, but also identify two separate forces





In the complete information model,
A1 =
(y1 + A0) − Z (y3 + r2y2)
1 + r1r2Z














and X = (β1δr2)
− 1





























(1 − ρ) β0δ2r1r22(β1 − 1)
dX
dβ1
= (−1/ρ) (β1δr2)−1/ρ−1 δr2 < 0
Apparently, the sign of dA1/dβ1 is determined by the sign of 1 − ρ because
64
β1 − 1 ≤ 0.
Appendix B
Income Process
Laibson et al. (2000) models the idiosyncratic income shock, ξt, as a sum of a
persistent shock, µt, and a transitory shock, νt. The persistent shock follows an
AR(1) process with a coefficient α.
ξt = µt + νt,
µt = αµt−1 + εt,
where εt ∼ N (0, σ2ε) and vt ∼ N (0, σ2v). He estimated α, σ2ε , σ2v for three different
education levels. The parameters for “completed college” are used in the estimation.
Define a quarterly income shock, ηq, such that ξt =
∑4t
q=4(t−1)+1 ηq.
ηq = sq + εq,
sq = fsq−1 + γq,
where sq is a quarterly persistent shock with a coefficient of f . γq ∼ N (0, σ2r) and
εq ∼ N (0, σ2ε ).







ε = (4 + 6f + 4f
2 + 2f 3)
σ2r




ε = (f + 2f
2 + 2f 3 + 4f 4 + 3f 5 + 2f 6 + f 7)
σ2r
1 − f 2
After obtaining parameters for the quarterly shock, we use a two-state Markov
process to replace the sq which follows an AR(1), following Laibson et al. (2000).
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The Markov process is symmetric taking two values {θ,−θ}, where θ =
√
σ2r
1 − f 2
and the transition probability p =
1 + f
2
. In this way the Markov process matches
the variance covariance of sq.
Recall the income process in the dynamic model, yt = ϕty
g
t +(1 − ϕt) ybt . yjt is
lognormal random variable, where j ∈ {g, b} and ϕt is a signal whether the income
state is good or bad.





= c − θ + εt
where c is a constant to capture the permanent income. To determine c, I assume
the mean income is $10,000 per quarter.
In summary, the income process in the good state has a mean of 10,000 and a
variance of 3.5× 105. The income process in the bad state has a mean of 7645 with
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